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POLITICAL RESURGENCE IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY, AND THE
BRANDFORT CONGRESS 6? 1904
If the people could have but the half or the
quarter of their claims paid they might at
least live, and if ... the Government wants
to make the people satisfied, that is the only
way. A starving population cannot feel pleased."
I have come to the conclusion that certain
cases of injustice do actually exist and they
are of greater frequency than perhaps can be
attributed to ordinary human errors of those
in Whose hands the decision rested ... I also
realise that even if we were to do so and
decided that we should distribute further sums
of money there is not in our possession the
necessary funds where with to make any farther
payments. '
Fortunately the better class have ceased to
believe in or hope for compensation, but the
poorer and more ignorant still look to it to
•ake a start, and the long deferred day when
the claims are paid will be one of bitter wai-
ling through the length and breadth of the
land. It has been a cruel mockery to raise
such false hopes, attended with an elaborate
machinery, and publicly to ask men to send in
detailed claims and summon them repeatedly at
cost of time and money to give evidence, and
all for a pittance, for nothing, or for worse
than nothing.')
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This paper has a two-fold purpose: firstly, it proposes
to examine whether class cleavages in the Orange River Colony
offered the potential for a reconstruction favourable to
British interests* secondly, it focusses on the prevailing
view that the victory of the republican Orangia Pnle party
in the 1907 election was a foregone conclusion.
The established interpretation has portrayed the free
Staters of the nineteenth century as a nation of self-sufficient
isolationists living in a 'model republic.' Contemporary
accounts often support the opinion of J Bryce who wrote, 'In
the Orange Free State I discovered in 1895, the kind of common-
wealth which the fond fancy of the philosophers of the last
century painted. It is an ideal commonwealth.*' J A Hobson
was similarly impressed '... the Free Staters knew what they
were doing and what they wished. They are proud of their
country and have good reason for their pride ... they have
built up one of the most successful nations the world has ever
seen.' Amongst the most praised features of the republic
was its homogeneity, whereby 'almal het tot dieselfde sosiale
stand behoort, almal was veeboere en landbouers, Bonder *n
noemenswaardige kloof tussen arm en r y k ' — everyone was of
the same social standing, all were either paatoraliats or
agriculturalists, with no noteworthy distinctions between
rich and poor.' The populist nature of the state extended to
itB government, which was 'altyd bereid om die burgers te
help om vraagstukke te bekamp' — always prepared to assist
its burghers.
Only recently and largely as a result of the work of
Timothy Keegan, has this teleological perspective been replaced
with the knowledge that the economy of the OFS had reached
a crisis point in the 1890s, being confronted with a decline
in self-sufficiency, an influx of speculative capital and
alienation of land.^ We now know that as a result of capitali-
sation within the Free State, and the corresponding crystal-
lisation of classes and development of state structures, wide-
spread accumulation and dispossession had occured prior to
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the Anglo-Boer War. The extent of this process being revealed
by the fact that as early as 1853, some 139 landowners owned
2,500,000 acres of land in the Free State, whilst in 1896
there were already 2,363 heads of families too poor to purchase
their own weapons.10 The Anglo-Boer War was to reveal just
how far societal dislocation had progressed. The records of
'protected burghers', those who either remained neutral or
actively fought for Britain show that some 28% of the popula-
tion rejected the republican cause.
In the post-war period the traditional interpretation
of the homogeneity and pro-republican stance of the Free State
population is reasserted in works examining the election of
1907. This election brought to power Abraham Fischer with
J B M Hertzog as his Attorney General and Director of Education.
The 'easy' victory of the Orangia Unie party has encouraged
the view that the period of British reconstruction was a brief
ineffectual interlude after which the republicans, with the
blessing of the burghers, merely resumed their task of governing.
This attitude is reflected in the following account of the
new government:
In the Orange River Colony, on the other hand,
conciliation was not the policy of the Govern-
ment. Unlike Het Volk, the Orangia Unie had
no incentive to woo English-speaking voters,
for the overwhelming majority of the Orange
River Colony electorate was Afrikaners. FurtBer-
12
more there was no Botha in the smaller colony.
This statement assumes that the coming to power of the Orangia
Unie was inevitable, that the Afrikaner majority was in such
accord that no other outcome was possible. More recently P Rich
has come to adopt a similar position regarding the victory
of the Orangia Unie. Whilst recognising the potential class
divisions within Afrikanerdom, he believes that the threat
posed by divisiveness amidst a heterogeneous environment led
to such divisions being subsumed within the context of the
nationalist struggle:
The existence of a class of poor whites in a
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racially divided context ... can be seen as
one crucial factor that destroyed any possi
bility of exploiting divisions within Afrikaner-
dom between HenBoppers and Bittereinders and
the potential class cleavages that these diffe-
rences suggested. Instead, economic differences
tended to get masked over in a cleavage defined
along "national" lines.13
This conception is in direct contradiction to the views of
Donald Denoon who believes that the dispossessed did offer the
reconstruction government the potential to split Afrikanerdom
along class lines. Denoon wrote:
Milner's paternalistic contempt for Afrikaners
as a whole, and his conviction that nationality
over-rode every other interest, immunised him
against overt malice. If he had been vindictive,
and had diverted the government's resources to
the patronage of the bljwoner class, the conse-
quences ... might have been very serious indeed.
It was Milner's short-sightedness as a result of his own innate
nationalism and racism, which led to the failure to take ad-
vantage of the opportunities offered by class divisions within
Afrikanerdom.
In terms of the historiographical controversies outlined above,
this paper seeks to show that following the war neither the
republicans nor the reconstruction government were able to
claim hegemony within the Orange River Colony, until the
period of reconciliation which followed the Brandfort Congress
of 1904. It is suggested that the existence of a substantial
bloc of disaffected burghers did present the British govern-
ment with the possibility of making political inroads into
the Orange River Colony. That, amidst the devastation caused
by the war, the potential to alter the political complexion .
of the colony came to depend upon the provision of adequate
relief and compensation.
Where the •protected burghers' were concerned, the Hilner
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Regime made substantial efforts to co-opt this class, bat
financial constraints left it unable to provide the full com-
pensation for damages promised during the war, The failure
of the reconstruction government, either to relieve the distress
of the people, or to provide acceptable compensation for the
'protected burgher' class led to widespread grievances. The
republicans were able to build on these grievances, and by
means of a campaign of conciliation, to create the base of
support seen in the 1907 election.
When the Anglo-Boer War ended, the 'ex-burghers' and
'protected burghers' came face to face in an atmosphere of
extreme bitterness and recrimination. The feelings of the
majority of 'ex-burghers' towards the 'protected burghers'
were conveyed by Eugene Marais, editor of Land en Yolk when
he wrote on 17 October 1902:
The feelings of hate ... are deep as the ocean
and wide as the Sod'a earth ... We hate these
people from the depth of our hearts because
they besmirched our honourable name. It is
not possible to forgive and even less to forget."
The bitterness between these two groups was encouraged
by the special consideration given to 'protected burghers' by
the reconstruction government. In August 1902 Sir Hamilton
Goold-Adams declared that although most of the 1,920 National
Scouts who fought for the British were bywonera, 'we ought to
do something more for them than for the ordinary bijwoners.'
During his visit to South Africa in 1903, Chamberlain assured
the hensopper generals, Andries Cronje and Fieter de Wet of
his support, 'Xhe British Government cannot and will not desert
those who have been its friends. We dont want to make distinc-
tions, but we recognise our duty to those who stood by us in
troublous times.' ' As a result of these feelings of indebted-
ness, rentfree loans were made available to 'protected burghers.'
During August 1902 an amount of £38,000, 30 waggons and 30 spans
of oxen were distributed amongst this class. In February 1903
each of the 'protected burghers* was given £50, or animals in
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1Rlieu of that amount. Some 250 'protected burghers' were also
given employment by the South African Constabulary as translators,
guides and plain-clothed detectives. Finally, some 71 landless
'protected burgher' families were included in the Land Settle-
ment abhame in the Orange River Colony.
Despite such rewards, the wealthier and influential
'protected burghers', those with property and possessions waited
anxiously for compensation. At Vereeniging the British govern-
ment agreed to set aside the sum of £3 million for 'ex-burghers'
in payment of war losses and receipts issued by the republican
governments during the war. A year later a fund of some £2 million
was instituted by the British government specifically for
'protected burghers' who had been promised full and fair com-
pensation for war losses. The loyalty of this class came to
depend upon the payment of such compensation, and as we shall
see disappointment was to lead to widespread defection to the
republican cause.
Despite their hatred of each other, the bitterelnders and
'protected burghers' did have one thing in common, and that
was a desire for recovery amidst the devastation that was the
Orange River Colony. She 'burnt earth' policy of the British
army had left thousands homeless and without a livelihood and
food itself was scarce, particularly after the drought of 1903.
Some idea of the extent of the destitution may be gathered from
the report of the magistrate of Frankfort following a tour round
his district in 1904. Of the 169 farms visited, only one family
wae still receiving relief, despite the fact that well over
half the families were existing only on mealies with occasional
vegetables. The magistrate appealed for the provision of relief
in the case of seventeen families, where the condition of elderly
burghers was 'absolutely desperate' and verging on starvation.
The predicament of the burghers is shown by the fact that in
the two years since the war, only 5 of the 169 homesteads had
been rebuilt. The magistrate wrote:
The homes are still unrepaired. I found only
5 houses rebuilt (i.e. more or less as they
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were before the war). The people are living in
the back portion of the house and the front
portion, that is the part between the gables,
is practically not used. She position of the
bywoners is of course at present such that they
are unable to repair their houses to any extent,
and the landowner, big and small, is so loathe
to bond his farm that he has at present no cash
to rebuild.21
In many cases the burghers retained their land and almost
nothing else. In order to purchase the bare necessities of
life many burghers turned to mortgaging their property. On the
farm Soedehoop, the owner V J fretorius living with his wife,
father-in-law and six children, was in the process of bonding
his property because then, 'they would get some meat.1 Of the
159 privately owned farms in this district some 50 had been
bonded in the two years since the war. :
The distressed conditions documented in the case of the
Frankfort district, were common throughout the Orange River
Colony. In an extensive tour after the war, Emily Hobhouae
provided a graphic account of the widespread destitution.
Having visited Bloemfontein, Boshof, Beandfort, Thaba Nchu,
Kopples, Heilbron and Jacobsdal, she wrote to her aunt ' ...
but I shall weary you — all along the route, wherever we
stopped, the condition of the people was the same — mealies
only and those at the last ebb; a famine of money everywhere.'22
Amidst such widespread poverty the question of government
relief and compensation for war damage came to dominate the
outlook of the people. The poor sought food and shelter, whilst
landowners lived in hopes of compensation which would save them
from bonding their properties.
The provision of relief must be viewed within the context
of Milner's reconstruction strategy as a whole. Convinced that
the political complexion of the ORC was irredeemably republican,
Milner focussed his efforts on transforming the Transvaal into
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a pro-British colony. This narrow focus was to lead to re-
construction being afforded a lower priority in the ORC which
in turn was to have far-reaching effects on the perceptions
and loyalty of the people. We can observe a number of important
distinctions in the manner in which reconstruction was carried
out in these two colonies. In the first place, whilst Milner
and Chamberlain considered using their powers of expropriation
to provide land for British settlers, this policy was never
implemented in the Transvaal. It was feared that such a policy
would create bitterness and unrest which might threaten recon-
struction. In the ORC in contrast, a policy of expropriation
PA.
was applied and created a great sense of grievance. Further
evidence of the lower priority afforded to reconstruction is
provided by the nature of the relief programme implemented in
that colony. Whilst a permanent solution to the 'poor white
problem* and rural dispossession was envisaged in the northern
colony, the farm, irrigation and railway relief works implemented
in the ORC were intended for the provision of temporary relief
only. The collapse of all the relief works in the ORC between
1904-1906 undermined the credibility of the government and
dispossessed thousands of burghers who had then to be supported
25by the community.
A further significant difference between reconstruction
in the ORC and the Transvaal lay in government attitudes to
commercial agriculture. In the Transvaal Milner soon realised
that there was no possibility of sufficient British settlers
being encouraged to achieve his political objectives. As a
result his government provided supports for the larger •pro-
gressive1 landowners, hoping that rural transformation under
their auspices would reduce the cost of living and so assist
the mining industry — the fulcrum on which his development
strategy hinged. In the ORC the reconstruction of commercial
agriculture was not afforded a high priority. The local repa-
triation commissions advanced the relatively small amount of
£65,879 in loans on first mortgage, although the orphan chamber
did advance further small amounts. The emphasis of reconstruction
expenditure in the ORC was on short-term relief in the form of
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supplies, with some £323,000 being distributed in this form.26
As a result of Milner's belief in the intractability of
the ORC population as a whole, his plans for the ORC focussed
specifically on Britieh land settlement. The target of this
land settlement was Afrikaner predominance in the rural areas.
Milner wrote, 'The man who thinks we intended to outnumber the
BOOTS on the land is an ass. But a greater ass is he who thinks
that is is no use attempting to leaven because you can't out-
27
number them ... ' By the end of the Crown Colony period some
691 settlers had been brought into the region, and an amount
of £1,200,000 expended on this project. A further £500,000 was
advanced during that year to ORC settlers. By 1912 the land
settlement scheme in the two republics had cost iZ\ million
and between 2,000-3,000 men, women and children had been
assisted.28
Milner1s colonisation efforts were to provoke great bitter-
ness amongst all classes of burghers in the ORC. 'Protected
burghers', republicans and those of British descent alike, were
incensed at the preferential treatment extended to 'outsiders',
whilst ao many of the inhabitants were struggling to survive.
A resolution, of the Brandfort Congress of 1904 read:
The Congress of Brandfort expresses its deep
conviction that the Government has not the right
to import from outside this Colony one single
new settler, and to support the same in the manner
in which this has been done hitherto, namely
at the expense of the people, as long as the
old inhabitants have not been saved from the
ruinous consequences of the war, and as long
as the settlers already imported are still
dependent for their existence upon the support
of the Government.2^
Perhaps it was The Friend which came closest to portraying
the feelings of the population with regard to the settlers.
In an article of 2 March 1905 it wrote, 'This is a pet scheme
of Lord Milner1a, run by him under the idea that British
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settlers brought into the Colony would prove a loyal backbone
to a disloyal body ... If Government had put aside some of
their numerous farms for poor Boers, and given each family
a plough and oxen, it would have conferred far more benefit
on the Colony than by introducing men who do not know the
country, and who still have their experience to buy.' The land
settlement scheme can thus be seen as an important factor
in the erosion of support for the reconstruction government.
It was those grievances created by compensation, however,
which were to become the most damaging to the Milner regime,
and to undermine the opportunity of reconciling 'protected
burghers' to the British cause. During the war this class had
been promised 'full and fair compensation' for all damage
suffered. There was no hope that the extravagent expectations
aroused by the 'protected burgher fund' could be met by the
British government. Instead of the promised £2 million, the
Central Judicial Commission finally received £1,936,376 3/5d.
The numerous claimants made a pro rata system of payment the
only alternative and it was decided to pay 10/- for every £1
claimed. At this rate, however, the fund was able to compen-
sate only a relatively small number of the-claimants and it
was in an effort to reduce their number that very stringent
conditions were applied. If any close relative of a 'protected
burgher', a brother, father or uncle had continued fighting
against the British, the claim was nullified. A further limi-
tation was imposed by declaring whether the claimant had rendered
any material- aid to the British forces during the war.'0
The cause and extent of 'protected burgher' grievances
may be gathered from two accounts written by Emily Hobhouse
during 1903. As it was the 'protected burghers' who began
the campaign of political resurgence in the ORC, it is impor-
tant to understand the mainsprings of their grievances, and
these accounts are therefore included in their entirety:
A few "Protected Burghers" were paid out in
Jacobsdal. One man, Lombard, came to me; he
was very sorry for himself. He had surrendered
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under Roberts; life and property was thus to
be protected. After this his flocks were all
taken, his house burnt, and his wife taken to
Klmberley camp ... he claims £1,300 and has
been told £300 is his share with £20 deducted
for rations since leaving camp.
So he has £280 lawyers fees to pay, his
living for the past year as well, and had £130
to begin life upon ... I could not pity him
very much because having £130 to begin upon
he is in clover compared to most Boers; but
I mention his case to show exactly how Lord
Roberts' promises worked out ... And if these
things are done in the green tree ("Protected
Burghers") what will be done in the dry.51
The fate of the 'protected burghers' elicited sympathy
from neither friend nor foe, and their anger grew at what
they considered was the dishonesty of the British government
reneging on promises made to them during the war. Discussing
the predicament of a community of 'protected burghers' Emily
Hobhouse wrote:
The population of the village, however is mostly
handsupper and scout, and these are all diffi-
cult to deal with and intensely dissatisfied.
They sacrificed principle and honour and fidelity
to their country to save their properties, for
they were rich; and now they find their goods
also destroyed or seized and the compensation
promised by Lord Roberts, for which mess of
pottage they sold their birthrights, comes out
or is coming out only a shadow of itself. They
are furious and I hear they mean in a body to
prosecute the Government (?) ... They think if
they can't get sympathy and can't get respect,
at least they'll try for the money.'
In this manner the failure of the British government either
to provide effective relief, or to meet the expectations of
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all classes of burghers regarding adequate compensation, created
a fertile field of grievance. An exasperated Milner was to
remark, 'Compensation has, on the whole, been rather a curse
.than a blessing. You give a man a pound, and he hates you for
it, because he asked for four and expected two, and all his
neighbours who have not got anything hate you equally."
We turn now to the Brandfort movement in order to show
that there was little political unity in the ORC before the
end of 1904; that the republicans were unable to motivate poli-
tical resurgence until the grievances of the 'protected burghers'
presented them with the opportunity to reconcile conflioting
class interests in the colony.
The first signs of political resurgence in the ORC came
in the second half of 1904, when a petition was addressed to
the Lieutenant-Governor Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams. A group of
'protected burghers' in the Harrismith district was reacting
to rumours that the compensation fund was practically insol-
vent and sought reassurance that their claims would still
be processed. The evasive reply of the Lieutenant-Governor
did little to assuage their fears.
The Harrismith petition led to a meeting of 18 concerned
people at the house of N Yermaak in Brandfort on 17 September
1904. Of the 18 people at the meeting all but two were 'pro-
tected burghers', whilst of these two, J F Marais fled to
Basutoland during the war. The only 'ex-burgher' was J J van
Rensburg who acknowledged that he was not there in hopes of
compensation, for as an 'ex-burgher' he had no expectations in
that regard. His reason for attending the meeting was that many
'protected burghers' owed him money and he sought reassurance
that he would be paid.'*
At the Vermaak meeting various resolutions were passed
deploring the unsympathetic attitude of the government in the
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light of its response to the Harrismith petition. It reiterated
the fear of many 'protected burghers' that they would not be
paid out. Those in attendance decided to call for a national
convention or volksvergadering, in order to present their case,
and to pressurise the government into fulfilling its obliga-
tions to them.
A week later on 24 September 1904, the so-called Vlotman
Manifesto was issued. J Vlotman had been chairman of the Ver-
maak meeting. A 'protected burgher* he was angered by the fact
that he had only received 15% of his claim. In terms of Lord
Roberts' amnesty, he believed that he was legally entitled to
full compensation. Originally issued in the form o£ a handbill,
the manifesto was published in The Friend newspaper of 28 Sep-
tember 1904. It noted:
We feel that the misery in our country has reached
a climax. Many farmers are suffering the extreme
of poverty, and even formerly wealthy persons
are everywhere to be met who stand on the brink
of bankcruptcy. We are also conscious that this
wide spread misery is largely due to the way in
which dor Government had thought fit to make
certain promises in regard to compensation, and
also the way in which these promises have been
interpreted and carried out ... The number of
grievances is legion. Destitution increases
day by day."'
In an effort to provide more widespread support for what was
essentially a 'protected burgher' movement the manifesto pro-
moted unity;
Brandfort has given you the right example. All
cl&sses of the poor population have there met
together, without distinction. The spirit of
unity is once more in our midst, brought here
by our sufferings.
It remained to be seen whether the Vlotman Manifesto would
provoke any response from the republicans.
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The next stage of the protest was precipitated by a message
sent through the resident magistrate of Brandfort, inviting
all the signatories of the manifesto to meet with the Lieu-
tenant-Governor and inform him personally of their grievances.
This meeting took place on 3 October 1904.
Goold-Adams was keen to subvert the Brandfort movement, and
to prevent it from growing in influence. In later correspon-
dence with Mllner, however, he pointed to his dilemma. At
the time of the meeting he was well aware of the ineptitude
and even corruption of the Central Judicial Commission in
dealing with compensation claims. He was also aware that rumours
of the closing of the compensation account was correct. Thus
his room for manoeuvre was extremely limited. ' It was perhaps
for this reason that he adopted an aggressive, blustering
stance during the meeting. The official correspondence refers
to the 'severe rubbing down1 which the delegates received.
Far from allaying the fears of the 'protected burghers',
Quold-Adams only succeeded in confirming them. In the face of
direct questioning, the Lieutenant-Governor was forced to
admit that the compensation account was almost closed. He also
revealed that compensation claims had been rejected in cases
where close relatives of 'protected burghers' were bittereinders.
When confronted with the high price of cattle provided by the
repatriation department he could only asgue that such was the
market price when the animals had been purchased, and although
these prices had depreciated the government could not be held
responsible,, This statement revealed the contradictory basis
of the government's relief efforts whereby such 'relief as
was given was to be repaid at market prices.
Mr van Renaburg, one of the signatories then referred
to the crux of the grievances held by the 'protected burghers'.
He pointed out that the amnesty offer issued by Lord Roberts
had promised protection and full compensation for all damage
suffered after surrendering. This promise it seemed, was not
being honoured. Once again the LieutenantdGovernor was forced
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to agree. He replied 'that when Lord Roberts made that pro-
clamation it wae that it would be compiled with as far as
possible. It was at a time when it was impossible to protect
property. In other words the Bri
going to honour the amnesty offer.
tish government was not
The meeting with the Lieutenant-Governor only served to
confirm the fears of the 'protected burghers'. 'After the
remarks that had fallen from the' Governor', Mr Vlotman noted,
'there was little to expect with regard to the claims.' The
Brandfort movement now became committed to political resurgence
and to confrontation with the government, in an effort to
force a reconsideration of their grievances. It also seems
that it was at this stage, once the meeting with the Lieutenant-
Governor had revealed the potential for confrontation, that
the Brandfort movement became subject to new initiatives.
Soon after the meeting, a second circular entitled 'The
Grievance Agitation' and signed by J Viescher, editor of The
friend was distributed throughout the ORC. This circular was
sent in the first instance, to burghers known to be sympathetic
to the republican cause. The fact that Viescher himself
signed the circular, and that it was aimed at republican sym-
pathisers, indicates a new phase in what had formerly been
a 'protected burgher' movement,, The involvement of The friend
newspaper was also important. This paper had been bought in
1304 by a syndicate whose directors included the leading
republicans, A Fischer , J B M Hertzog, Dr Alfred Ramsbottom,
C H Weasels, C G fichardt and Jack Brebner. As a result of its
efforts in support of the republican cause the paper ran short
of funds because as Arthur Barlow the editor at that time wrote,
the new directors 'thought more of politics than of business.
They were using the paper to build a golden bridge into a
new cabinet ... Politics, not profit, was their aim.'" Shortly
afterwards Louis Botha came to the rescue of the newspaper
with £8,000, '... for national purposes.' David Graaff
(father of Sir George de Tilliers Graaff) was to provide a
further £2,000.^ Viescher with his well known republican .,
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views was appointed editor in March 1904, and the paper took
its place alongside De Yolksstem in Pretoria, Het Weaten in
Potehefstroom, The Krugersdorp Herald, the Natal Afrikaner and
the Highveld Herald. These newspapers were all purchased during
the same period, with the intention of creating the right
climate for the political revival of republicanism.*
In the second circular Visscher went to great lengths to
promote the idea of unity. A common cause was to be established
between 'ex-burghers', 'hensoppers' and 'national scouts*.
The circular promoted the idea of a volkskongres which '... is
to be general and shall embrace all sections of the people.'
The obvious fear was that if the 'protected,burghers' were
alienated, the ralson d'etre of the movement would be lost,
and it would collapse. A temporary committee was to be esta-
blished in each district '... including if possible an even
number of ex burghers (wild Boers) and protected burghers
filling up with a war official, and if practicable, also a
representative of the National Scouts.' The circular added
that in the case of National Scouts, only those should be
chosen who had repented of their actions and were prepared to
declare their repentance in open-meeting.
This arrangement was mutually beneficial to all parties.
A pro-republican structure was grafted onto the former 'protected
burgher'movement, whilst at the same time 'protected burghers'
were given the opportunity to present their grievances in a
national forum, and to be reintegrated into the community.
Finally the National Scouts were also offered the opportunity
to atone for their 'sins'.
' Following the circular, attempts were made at conciliation
all over the ORC. A confidential report presented to Ooold-
Adams pointed out that the 'wild Boers' were suddenly 'professing
a great friendship for the Handsuppers and National Scouts' and
'these individuals were now welcomed back to the fold.' The
personal example of General de Wet was held out to the people.
The rebuilding of his farmhouse was carried out by Cornelius
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Lombaard, who as a National Scout during the war, did 'excellent
work' with the British forces of Bruce Hamilton and Damant.
The pre-war friendship between De Wet and Abraham Spies also
continued after the war, despite Spies being 'one of the best
men we had in the FID1 — the Field Intelligence Department
— a National Scout operation. The correspondent provided
numerous examples of efforts at conciliation including:
an instance ... where an influential Justice
of the Peace who had been at variance with his
neighbours, both in and since the war, was in-
vited to and attended a dance given specially
in his honour by a family who are known, as
also are their relatives to be the most ardent
of "patriots". This man was received most warmly
by all present and the breach which existed
between him and the wild Boers in the neigh-
bourhood was healed.
In this manner the Brandfort movement attempted to heal the
effects of societal transformation which had followed the mineral
revolution. In the post-war environment, with most burghers in
bleak circumstances, the British government was seen to have
failed in its efforts at reconstruction. Many burghers now came
to see their only hope in political unity, and a return to
republican government.
During November 1904, events moved to a climax, and it was
decided to hold the volkskongres at Brandfort in the south
west of the ORC. It was here that the movement had crystalised
amongst 'protected burghers' and here that it had its most
immediate support. The government believed the volkskongres
was located at Brandfort because this town was close to the
eastern constituency of General Hertzog. Brandfort was also
close to the offices of The Friend newspaper at Bloemfontein.
Meetings were held throughout the ORC to elect delegates
to the congress. Resident magistrates were asked to attend these
meetings and to forward comments to the Lieutenant-Governor.
It appears from these reports, as was to be expected, that
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districts with a high concentration of "protected burghers'
and Prinsloo surrenders showed the greatest interest in the
proceedings, i.e. Bethlehem, Brandfort, Fauresmith, Harrismith,
Ladybrand and Fhillipolis. Elsewhere in the ORC meetings were
considered unrepresentative and poorly attended. An indication
of the lack of interest, particularly amongst 'ex-burgher'
districts is shown in the case of Frankfort, where no represen-
tative was chosen at all. This district opposed the Brandfort
Congress and its attempt at political resurgence.
On the eve of the Brandfort Congress the Lieutenant-Governor
wrote a report to Hilner. Far from criticising the delegates
to the congress, Goold-Adams believed that amongst them were
'a large proportion of fair-minded and moderate men ... not
politically anti-British.' The motivation behind the movement
he saw as stemming from the very real grievances which existed
among the burghers regarding compensation. G-oold-Adams acknow-
ledged that because of the sheer scale of the compensation
exercise, 'mistakes were absolutely inevitable.' Yet his tour
through the south-eastern portions of the ORC had convinced
him of gross irregularities.
He pointed out that whole districts had been adversely
effected regarding compensation, because of 'hasty or irascible
officers'. Many widows had been excluded from the 'protected
burgher' funds, even though their husbands had died after sur-
rendering. In a number of cases he had found that regional com-
pensation- boards had not applied the same criterion when dealing
with applicants. Finally, he pointed out that burghers had been
blackmailed into accepting much smaller compensation payments
because they were told that if they did not accept, they would
have to take the chance of a much greater loss in the final
distribution.51
Goold-Adams pointed out that he had been able to investigate
and redress only a very few of the glaring cases of irregularity
brought to his notice, and that 'a considerable number will have
to go unredresaed.' During the meeting with the Brandfort
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representatives he had personally supported their grievances,
but believed it 'impolitic to expose the basis of the CJC.'
The only equitable solution he believed, was to appoint a
commission of inquiry into the CJC. This course of action though,
might ultimately prove a greater source of embarrasment to the
government, if the CJC was found to have been as inconsistent
as he suspected. In that case, the government would not have
the money available to affect large scale redress.
The extent to which the Brandfort Congress had become a
platform for republican aspirations was made visible on the eve
of the meeting, when the important steering committee Has chosen.
This committee was to introduce the subjects for debate, and
to forward the conclusions arrived at by the delegates to the
government. Judge Hertzog was appointed chairman, with S R
Grobler as vice-chairman. A representative of the southern
district of Phillipolls, Grobler had been chairman of the old
Free State Volksraad, and a former Hoofd-Commandant in the
republican army. Thereafter, he had surrendered and become a
'protected burgher.' His election was thus an attempt to bridge
the gap between 'ex-burghers' and 'protected burghers', as was
the appointment of J Vlotman, as honorary chairman in recog-
nition of his earlier efforts in forwarding the movement. Finally
J Visscher was made secretary.'
The government attempted to discredit the conference through
the medium of the Bloemfontein Post. On the opening/day the
newspaper published an article pointing out that the gathering
was far from representative and had been engineered by political
opportunists. It stated that there were 'no intelligent Afrikan-
ders' present.'' This attack set the tone of the first day, as
delegate after delegate attempted to prove the representative-,
ness of the congress. The English-speaking mayor of Harrismith,
A Caskie reflected the desire of the delegates to prove their
sincerity. Humonously he told the audience that 'when he left
Harrismith he certainly had expected to meet respectable people
in this Congress, but had since read that they were people
without influence and respectability, and he almost feared he
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was going to be like the man who went down to Jericho and fell
among thieves (laughter).1**
The now acknowledged leaders of the congress, ex-generals
Hertzog and De Wet went to great lengths to deny any responsibi-
lity for the volkakongrea, the mainsprings of which they said
emanated in the widespread distress afflicting the people.
General Hertzog went so far as to declare that he had known
nothing of the congress until two weeks previously, believing
that separate congresses were to be held amongst 'ex-burghers',
•protected burghers' and settlers." Ihe 'protected burgher1
origins of the movement ware not denied, and Fepler, the delegate
for Modderrivier nfited that it was 'Lord Roberts' paper lyddite
shells (his offer of amnesty), which had caused such dissention
amongst the burghers during the war, and which now brought the
Congress together.1'
for the congress to be successful, the earlier moves at
reconciliation between 'ex' and 'protected burghers' had to
be cemented. It also became apparent during the congress, that
attempts were being made to draw English-speakers into the
movement in order to diffuse yet another potentially divisive
power bloc. The congress was characterised by sustained appeals
for unity. Ihe deep divisions within the society ' which the
war had revealed, were to be forgotten. Instead, a return to
the republican government of the past was promoted, as offering
the only alternative to the failure of British government.
The republic had shown that the Afrikaner was capable of solving
his own problems, all that stood in the way was disunity and
the British government. De Wet, amongst many others declared,
the deeds of 'hensoppers' and joiners were to be forgiven:
even if I hated those persons at the time so
that I could not bear their presence — a thing
I have not the least thought of at present, as
I call them all brothers — (cheers) — I
would still say that with regard to compensation
they are entitled to twenty shillings in the
ponnd.
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The Brandfort Congreas also included an appeal to heal
the socio-economic grievances within the society between the
educated burghers, predominantly from Bloemfontein and the
south-east, and the rest of the society. De Vet pointed out
that the Free State army had been led by well-educated people:
my experience was, that the flower of our army
consisted, with few exceptions — as of my
class, the "Takhaars", of men of education
(cheers). The educated young burghers were the
flower of our army. A firmer proof, in support
CO
of education, we cannot picture ...
Be Wet was referring to the sundering effects of the societal
transformation which had occurred and was appealing for unity
and understanding to overcome these effects.
It was Hertzog who summed up the conclusions of the Congress
and presented the delegates with the alternative of republican
self-government. 'She people of the ORC were the people of the
OPS. The OPS had had a government which was recognised through-
out the world as a "model government".' He asked what the
British reconstruction period had achieved:
After the war the new Government inherited a
complete legislation, and if they had only
followed it, if they had merely stepped into
the shoes of the men whom they succeeded, and
had continued on the same line the people would
have been satisfied: but what have they done?
They tried to introduce innovations and thought
we were not quite up to date with the latest
European ideas. They have accumulated debts and
spent our capital in royal fashion. When the
capital is spent, we will be called upon to
pay it. Under those conditions we have every
right to demand self-government to demand that
we be governed as we were before..
Hertzog concluded that what was needed was a return to the past,
and to a 'model government' which would restore prosperity.
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On 20 June 1905 a second volkskongres was held at Bloemfontein
and the pattern of this congress was similar to that at Brand-
fort. It, too, was characterised by frequent appeals to unity
amongst 'ex-burghers', 'protected burghers' and English
speakers. Where the Bloemfontein Congress went further, was
to accept recommendations for the setting up of a volkeparty
to achieve self-government. From this time on future congresses
were held under the auspices of the Orangia Unie party.
On the 20 November 1907 the first self-government election
was held. Far from being a walk-over, this was an acrimonious
and bitterly-contested election. The English-speakers were
largely united by their fear of the coining to power of republi-
can extremists. Much of the English-speaking vote was concen-
trated in Bloemfontein and was split between the pro-Imperia-
list and pro-capitalist Constitutional Party led by Sir John
Fraser, and the Labour Party. Financial support for the Con-
stitutional Party came from Sir Lionel Phillips who put the
62
Bloemfontein Post at the disposal of this party. The Labour
Party formed on 23 July 1906 mainly represented railway workers
fearful of losing their jobs to Afrikaner workers and 'poor
whites' should the Milner patronage system be replaced. This
party was absorbed by the Constitutional Party during 1907.
The Orangia Unie attempted to split the English-speaking
vote by promoting racial unity. English-speaking republicans
such as Dr Ramsbottom made impassioned pleas for 'the two
greater sections of the population to trust each other.' Such
attempts at conciliation were undermined, however, by the
failure of the round table conference in 1907 between the
Orangia Unie and the Constitutional Party aimed at reconciliation.
After the conference General Hertzog declared that 'Die Kon-
stitusionele Party moet vernietig word. 0ns moet sy kop afkap'.
— - The Constitutional Party had to be destroyed and its head
cut off.63
The English-speaking vote largely remained united in
voting against the republicans. The Constitutional Party won
- 22 -
4 of the 6 seats in HLoemfontein, losing one seat by only 2
votes. Dr Ramsbottom who was put forward as the Orangia Unie
candidate for Bloemfontein City, an English-speaking stronghold
was defeated; the appeals for racial unity had fallen prey
to Imperial and class sentiments.
The Afrikaner vote was also split along class lines. It
remained to be seen whether the Orangia Unie would be success-
ful in its attempts to co-opt the 'protected burghers' and
dispossessed. The republicans made promises to the 'poor whites'
and others of a 'back to the land1 strategy, should they be
elected. Industrial schools were to be built for 'poor white'
children and labour colonies were to be set up on the lines
of the Kakamas colony at the Cape. A solution to the 'poor
white problem' was also to be sought 'deur werkverskaffing'
— through Job creation.
The 'protected burghers' and other Afrikaners who did
not support the republicans were not represented by an esta-
blished party. Xhe difficulties in setting up such a party
amidst the post-war bitterness that characterised the Afrikaner
community can be surmised. Neither did the pro-Imperial and
almost anti-Afrikaner stance of the Constitutional Party have
much appeal for this middle ground. The OBangla Onle was able
to gain great advantage from the lack of organised opposition
within the Afrikaner community, which came to be represented
by Independents. Of the 38 seats in the Free State legislature,
the Orangia Onie won 14 seats unopposed, which was close to
40% of the vote. Two independents were also elected unopposed
which meant that 45£ of the vote was accounted for before the
election began. The republicans with their superior party
organisation had taken control of all the southern districts,
most of the south western districts and the extreme northern
districts. Independents, however, came to power in the cosmo-
politan atmosphere of the Jagersfontein, Koffyfontein diamond
mines, and in the wealthy tobacco-producing Farys-Vredefort-
Heilbron north-western districts.
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The election, in reality, thus involved only 22 of the
38 seats which were concentrated in HLoemfontein (6 seats),
and in the central and wealthy eastern 'conquered territory*
districts. Of these 22 districts the Orangia Unie took 14
seats, or 59% of the contested vote. Some 8,859 people voted
for the Orangia Unie, whilst 6,75 people or 41# voted for
other candidates. Outside of Bloemfontein, the towns of Harri-
smith and Kroonstad elected non-republicans. It was in the
•conquered territory' districts of Ladybrand, Thaba Nchu and
Wepener, however, where independents were the most successful.
These districts had the largest concentrations of 'protected
burghers' during the war, Wepener with 56% of its population,
Thaba Nchu 36# and Ladybrand 30,5£. It seems that the republi-
cans had not been able to co-opt the population of these
wealthier and more cosmopolitan districts.
The two-fold purpose of this paper was to assess whether
the Orange River Colony population offered the potential for
a reconstruction favourable to British interests; and to decide
whether the victory of the Orangia Unie party in 1907 was a
foregone conclusion. This research has shown that the republic
was sundered by capital accumulation and dispossession prior
to the Anglo-Boer War. According to official statistics some
28# of the population was to defect from the republican cause
during the war, although the real percentage was likely to
have been much higher. Following the war bitterelnders and
'protected burghers' faced each other in an atmssphere of
mutual hatred. Shis environment did offer the potential for
British inroads into the Orange River Colony, had the reconstruc-
tion government proved viable and addressed post-war poverty
and demands for orompensation. The focus of the reconstruction
government, however, w a s determined by Miner's belief in the
pro-republican complexion of the ORC, and financial exigiencies,
left it unable to provide the substantial support which might
have co-opted the 'protected burgher' and dispossessed classes.
Contrary to the opinion of some historians, the success of the
Orangia Unie party in the 1907 election was not a foregone
conclusion, as the bitterly contested campaign was to prove.
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Faced with a societal rift going back to the Basuto Ware and
earlier, the Orangla Unie party forced its followers into
wide-spread and probably painful efforts at compromise with
'protected burghers', the dispossessed and English-speakers
alike. It had earned its victory in the 1907 election.
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APPENDIX A
Central Judicial Commission Record of Protected Burghers and
ex:-burghers in ^ the Orange-River Colony**'
Protected burghers &e-burgher %
Bethlehem , 291 1161 20,4
Eethulle 260 706 26,9
Bloemfontein • 433 HS9 22,5
Boshof 105 1144 8,4
Sdenburg . 96 353 21,3
Paureamith 166 . 1014 14,0
Picksburg . . 444 ' 301 59,5
Frankfort . 124 • 374 12,4
Harrismith 247 1059 13,9
Heilbron : 135 915 12,8
Hoopstad . 112 799 12,2
Jacobsdal .112 218 . 33,9
Krponstad . • 302 1577 15,9
Ladybrand . 337 767 30,5
Lindley 126 623 16,8
Phillipolis not available
Rouxville 211 1113 15,9
Senekal . not available
Smithfield 286 613 31,8
Ihaba Nchu . 212 371 36,3
Vrede . 129 607 17,5
Vredefort 97 937 8,9
rfepener . . . 328 257 56,0
Winburg 832 2116 27,8
burgher1 category.
APPBHDII B

























































































































8859. 59* of contested rote
Party; 6075. 41* of contested vote
14934
FOOTNOTES
1. R van Reonen, Emily Hobhouae Boer War Letters (1984),
Letter to Lady Hobhou8e, 10 June 1903, p 193. Hereafter
The Hobhouae Letters.
2. ORC CO 567, Hamilton Goold-Adams, Lieutenant-Govemor of
the Orange River Colony to Milner, 30 November 1904, on
the eve of the Brandfort Congress
3. The Hobhouae Letters, Letter to Lady Hobhouae, 21 July
1903, p 239
4. See for instance F A van Jaarsveld, The Awakening of Afrikaner
Nationalism 1868-1881 (1961), p 154, who writes:
A feeling of solidarity and of union made the
Free Staters realize that they were a single
people, and this in turn made isolationists
of them
and A P J van Reneburg, Die Ekonomiese herstel van die Afri-
kaner in die Oranjerivier Kolonie 1902-1907, unpub D Phil
(UOVS) 1964, prologue
Die boerdery was in die eerste plek vir horn
nie "n middel om geld te verdien nie, maar
die draer van sy huisgesin en van *n hele
lewenswyae. Die hele ekonomiese struktuur
het dus verarming teengewerk
5. J Bryce, Impressions of South Africa (1900), p 314
6. J A Hobaon, The War in South Africa; its causes and effects
(1902)
7. H P N Muller, Zuid-Afrika Reisherinneringen (1900), p 44
and A P J van Rensburg, op cit., p 147
8. A P J van Renaburg, op cit., p 148
9. Timothy Keegan, 'Trade, Accumulation and Impoverishment:
Mercantile capital and the Economic Transformation of
Lesotho and the Conquered Territory, 1870-1920', JSAS,
vol 12, no 2, April 1986
10. A Kieser, President Steyn in die krlsisjare (1951), p 42
and Sim Keegan, 'Dispossession and Accumulation in the
South African Interior: She Boers and the Bathlaping of
Bethulie, 1894-1861', unpub paper, p 8 quoting J S Gal-
braith, Reluctant Bnplre; British Policy on the South
African frontier (1963), p 271
11. List of the Archives of the Central Judicial Commiaalon
(1903-1906) compiled by Misses WJ Retief and B Kriek (1979)
12. L M Thompson, The Unification of South Africa. 1903-1910
(1960), p 34
13. P Rich, 'The Agrarian Counter-Revolution in the Transvaal
and the origins of segregation: 1902-1913', in AS I working
papers, 5, 1977, p 64. Although primarily discussing the
Transvaal, Rich's statement is obviously equally applicable
to the Orange River Colony
14. D Denoon, 'Capitalist Influence' and the Transvaal Government
during the Crown Colony Period 1900-1906', The Historical
Journal. XI, 2, (1968), pp 82-83 quoted in P Rich, op cit.,
p 65
15. Quoted in A Grundlingh's chapter 'Collaborators in Boer
Society', in The South African War, op cit., p 276
See also Leon Rousseau, Die Groot Verlange (1974), p 170
16. CS 490/03 British Intelligence, quoted in A P J van Rensburg,
op cit.. p 240
17., The Friend. 6 February 1903
18. A P J van Rensburg, op cit.. p 240
19. Cd 155/1903, p 202 and pp 194-195
20. A P J van Rensburg, op cit., pp 217-219
21» A/5116/04 Report by the Resident Magistrate, Frankfort,
Orange River Colony, dated 6 June 1904
22. The Hobhouae Papers, Letter to Lady Hobhouse, 2 August 1903,
p 257
23. See S E Katzenellenbogen, 'Reconstruction in the Transvaal*
in Peter Warwick, The South African War (1980), p 342
24. GG 892, 17/548 Orange Free State Land Settlement Board.
Report by the chairman on Land Settlement operations during
the period 1 October 1901 to 30 September 1912
25. CT 144t 33/138; G B Beak, The Aftermath of the War (1906),
p 206 and p 209; GOV 95, file PS 87 letter of 6 April 1904;
A416 Hassard C, Orange River Colony Relief Works, pp 19-22;
TKP 206, Transvaal Administrative Reports, part 1, Administra-
tion of Burgher Camps, 10 March 1903
26. GOV 208, file Gen 19/04 Milner to Alfred Lyttelton, 14
November 1904 and G B Beak, op cit., p 49
27. Cecil Headlam (edit.) The Milner Papers, SA 1899-1905 (1933),
Milner to Selborne, 14 April 1905, p 555
28. A P J van Rensburg, op cit., p 273
29. Official Minutes of the Brandfort Congress, p 142
30. Central Judicial Commission Final Report, 1906, p 37
31. The Hobhouse Papers, Letter to Lady Hobhouse, 23 October 1903,
p 302
32. The Hobhouae Papers, Letter to Lady Hobhouse, 30 (23) August
1903, p 273
33. Quoted in A Grundlingh's 'collaborators in Boer Society1,
op cit., p 276
34. Official Minutes of the Brandfort Congress, p 96
35. ORC CO 1032, Misc Correspondence, Report of the Brandfort
Congress
.36. Ibid.
37. ORC CO 567, Lieutenant-Governor to Milner, 30 November 1904
38. ORC CO 1032, Miac Correspondence, Report of the Brandfort
Congress
39. Official Minutes of the Brandfort CongresB, p 100
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p 99
42. ORC CO 1032, Misc Correspondence, Report of the Brandfort
Congress
43. Arthur G Barlow, Almost in Confidence (1952), p 113
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. See 0 Denoon, op cit., p 87, and T R H Davenport, The
Afrikaner Bond (1966), p 295
47. ORC CO 1032, Nisc Correspondence, Report of the Brandfort
Congress
48. Ibid.
49. ORC CO 567, file 120/04 replies to CON 9652/04. 20 December
1904; ORC CO 574, file 9652/04} and C J P le.Roux, Sir
Hamilton John Ooold-Adams ae rol in die Oranjerivier-Kolonie
1901-1910. unpub MA (RAU), 1977, pp 51-54
50. ORC CO 567, file 115/04
51. ORC CO 567, Lieutenant Governor to Milner, 30 November 1904
52. Official Minutes of the Brandfort Congress, p 122. It is
informative to contrast the delegates who assembled at Brand-
fort, in terms of elites and classes of society from which
the delegates were chosen, with those who assembled for the
Transvaal vergadering of May 1904. In contrast to the Trans-
vaal where no 'protected burghers' attended the congress,
some 10# of the ORC delegates were of this class. This figure
though, reflects the extent to which the Brandfort Congress
had been taken out of the hands of its originators and was
now controlled by the republicans. Some 26# of the ORC dele-
gates were ex-generals or commandants, field cornets or other
republican officials. This number was a great deal less than
the 31% of republican officials who attended the Transvaal
meeting. The extent to which the old 'organic solidarity'
of free State society had broken down during the war is thus
revealed. Also reflecting the evolving nature of the elite
in the ORC, was the fact that 10% of the delegates were
from the legal profession in contrast to 5% of this class
in the Transvaal. In part this was due to their obvious •
knowledge of the compensation issue, but also reflected the
prominence attained by the legal profession in forwarding
the republican platform. That the representatives were almost
completely composed of wealthier burghers and landowners
is shown by the fact that only one bywoner was elected as
a delegate to the Brandfort Congress. There were thus almost
no representatives of the pre-war landless class who might
have challenged the validity of the pre-war Free State being
a 'model republic*. Arthur Barlow was perhaps closer to the
truth when he wrote that for many, the 'model republic'
never got much further than the model. See Arthur 0 Barlow,
op cit.. p 113. Transvaal figures given in N 6 Oarson, 'Ret
Voile1: The Botha - Smuts Party in the Transvaal 1904-1911,
The Historical Journal. XI, (1966), p 129 f.na 132 and the
ORC figures are contained in the official minutes of the
Congress, pp 25-28, and ORC CO 1032, report on the delegates.
53. HLoemfontein Post. 1 December 1904
54. Official Minutes of the Brandfort Congress, p 143
55. Ibid., p 153
56. Ibid., p 117
57. Ibid., p 108, '
58. Ibid., p 151
59. Ibid., p 147
60. See C J le Roux, op cit., p 59:
'n besondere kenmerk van die kongres was die beroep
wat hulle op alle Afrikaans- en Engelssprekendes gedoen
het, veral diegene wat reeds tydens die oorlog hulle
wapens neergel§ het, om die verskille van die verlede
te vergeet en saam te staan om te agiteer vir meer
regte.
61. For instance the July 1907 Congress of the Orangia Unie
party
62. A H Marais, op cit.. p 32
63. The griend, 19 April 1907
64. Ibid.
65. See D J Jacobs, Die ontwikkeling van tandbou in die Yrystaat
1890-1910, D Litt et Phil (UOVS) 1979., pp 38-42
66. Appendix B
67. List of the Archives of the Central Judicial Commission
Q9O3-1906) compiled by Misses WJ Retief and B Kriek (1979)
